Policy uncertainty, information asymmetries, and financial intermediation by Caprio, Gerard
I  WSOfSw3
PoiT  v  rch
WO.RKING PAF-'  s
Financial  Policy  and  Systems
Country  Economics  Department








Policy advisors should be circumspect in forecasting rapid post-
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reform  programs should consider the extent  to  which  bank
relationships will be disrupted, either by failing banks or by the
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Financial reform is often accompanied by other  the risk associated with lending to new clients. The
changes, including structural adjustment; the success  period of uncertainty shou:d persist for only a limited
of the combined experiment depends on the extent  time - at most, two to three years after structural
and efficiency of subsequent investments. Entrepre-  adjustment; a "sunset" period should be firmly
neurs' judgments about investing in a post-reform  imposed on any subsidies.
world (often affected by the costs of entry and exit  Alternatively, governments could give an
and the probability that a reform will be revcrsed) are  investment tax credit on information capital. Because
important but so are banks' considcrations of thc sunk  information is difficult to measure, the credit would
costs of investments in both physical capital and  be equal to some small proportion of loans made. In
information development.  effect, this would amount to the government tempo-
In industrial cconomics in normal times, informa-  rarily buying down the rate for beneficiaries. Even
tion costs are low, banks have ample information, and  after such a tax credit program expires, bank spreads
information is rarcly destroyed (as when a large part  could be expected to be sizable, since lending to
of the banking system fails). But in developing  newer films is more costly than lending to a few large
economies, banks may possess limited information  entervrises. But as these new firms grow, spreads
about only a few large firms, and the potential for  shsuda decline.
destroying much information capital is greaL Partly  The best candidates for reform - in both real
for this reason, some countries - especially very  and financial sectors - are countries with more
poor ones A ith undiversified financial systems-  divcrsified banking systems. These arc more likely in
have difficulty with financial reform.  well-divcrsified economies, with no recent history of
Caprio argues that policy advisors should be  severe financial repression. Countries that have
circumspect in forecasting rapid post-adjustment  tightly limited residents' ability to hold foreign assets
recovery, and structural adjustment and financial  may facc a portfolio adjustment as they ease capital
reform programs should consider the extent to which  controls under reform, since they are in effect
bank relationships are going to be disrupted, either by  introducing another potentially lower-risk asset.
failing banks or by the destruction of information.  Countrics that have had relatively open capital
The accepted wisdom is that financial reform  markets will be better off since they do not have pent-
should not precede "real" sector adjustmcnt, or banks  up demand for such assets.
will get in trouble by lending at disequilibrium priccs.  Well-capitalized banking systems will naturally
But postponing all financial reform until structural  tend to fare better under reform, even though ample
adjustment is complete is equally dangerous: unless  financial capital may not lead banks to lend aggres-
the financial sector is prepared, investors will not  sively in the face of greater uncertainty (such as
have enough capital to invest, even given credible  substantially reduced information). Clear signals from
programs.  reforming governments on where policies are headed
One potential form of preparation is an cxtension  will help both cntrepreneurs and their financiers.
service for the financial sector, to give firms account-  Without these  , Ynals,  banks will not be sure where to
ing training and to help auditing firms get started.  concentratc their investment in gathering information,
Partial guarantees to younger firms in, say, the export  and periods of loan retrenchment are more likely to be
sector (after devaluation) might help offset some of  prolonged.
ThePo'cyResearchWorking  PaperScriesdisseminales thefindingsofwork  under wayin theBank. Anobjectiveofthcseries  I
is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations arc Iess than full)  polished. The findings, interpretations, and
conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official Bank policy.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterTable of Contents
I.  Introduction  ........................................  1
II.  Background on Reforming Economies ..........................  2
m.  Structural adjustment  without a frinancial  sector  ...................  4
IV.  Credit Rationing with "Platonic" Banks  .........................  6
V.  Credit Crunches with More Informed Banks  .....................  14
VI.  Implications for Financial Liberalization  ........................  20
Appendix  ....................  .....................  23I.  Introduction'
The reform of financial  markets -- including  the lifting or easing of interest rate
controls, portfolio requirements, and credit controls -- in many cases follows decades of
government  intervention  and usually reflects a significant  change in either policy makers or in
their thinking.  Thus, the analysis of the effects of financial  reforms is difilcult, in that they
rarely take place in a vacuum, but instead often are associated  with a more widespread
liberalization  of policies.  The latter process, dubbed structural adjustment, frequently
encompasses  the removal of price controls, exchange  rate realignment,  and decreases in
effective  protection.  As noted in several studies (such as Faini, De Melo, 1990), subsequent
performance of investment  often has been weaker than expected,  and the financial sector
routinely is regarded in countries undergoing  adjustment  as the culprit.  Yet it is arguable that
in such environments  weakness  in investment  should hardly be surprising.  Rtent  literature
on the credibility  of government  policy focuses  attention  on the behavior of real sector
investors, analyzes the factors to be weighed in their decisions  to respond to ;i,zw  incentives,
and highlights  the (stringent) conditions needed  to elicit investment  following  structural
adjustment.
One limitation  of this literature is its omission of banks or other financial
intermediaries,  or the equivalent  assumption  that intermediaries  will behave in line with
investors, i.e.,  that once investment  decisions  are made by firm owners or managers,
financing  will follow automatically. However, when there are information  asymmetries
between intermediaries  and borrowers, the flow of finance may be more sluggish  than
assumed  in the literature.  In developed  countries  breakdown  of the relationship  between
intermediaries  and borrowers may only occur during times of extreme financial  distress, as
argued by Bernanke (1983) for the United States in the Great Depression  and Kennedy  (1989)
for late 19th century Britain.  In normal times, abundant  sources of information  allow for
ample bank and nonbank financing  of investment. However, in developing  countries this
'The author acknowledges  valuable comments  from Izak Atiyas,  Patrick Honohan, Bruce  Greenwald,  Ross
Levine, Fabio Schiantarelli,  Andrew Sheng, and Andrew  Weiss, but at the same time  accepts responsibility  for
remaining  errors.breakdown may be a more regular event, and can be quite common  in the wake of a
structural adjustment  progiam or a liberalization  of the financial system.
After some background  on reforming economies, the present paper will review first the
simple model in which banks are absent, and thej turn to the case in which banks are present
but know relatively little (in particular, are unable to distinguish  among borrowers).  Even in
this framework, banks' financial  condition matters in their ability and willingness  to respond
to investment  opportunities. When banks are well informed about their credits, as in the case
when they use long term relationships  with their clients to acquire information  about
borrowe;s, both the information  capital and the financial  capital of banks affect their
response.  Reforms likely work better when less of these two types of capital are destroyed.
Succinctly  put, the success of structural adjustment  depends in part on the state of the
financial  sector and any concomitant  financial  reforms that are adopted.  More generally, the
manner by which financial sector policies affect the real economy  are highlighted. The last
section notes some of the implications  of this approach for financial  reforms, and offers some
advice on improving reform efforts. 2
11.  Background  on Reforming  Economies
A growing body of re!  ch in recent years has focussed  on the experience with
World Bank-IMF adjustment  programs in the 1980s. This experience is deemed to be of
special interest since it was during that period that these programs focussed more on the
restoration of long-run growth, to the point that they were labelled "growth-oriented
adjustment  programs."  As summarized  in Faini, de Melo, et al. (1990), there is no evidence
-- at least in the data through 1986 -- of a statistical  difference in growth performance
2Successfil  financial  reform means not just avoiding  the failure  of banks and other parts of the financial
system, but also entails a more  efficient  allocation  of capital and, ultimately, a greater equalization  of the
marginal  efficiency  of capital throughout  the economy  than would have been the case otherwise. Some
empirical  testing of the impact  of reforms on the investment  behavior  of firms is being undertaken  as part of the
research  project, The Impact  of Financial Reform, and will also be attempted, with far larger data sets, as part
of the project, Investment  Decisions. Capital  Market Imperfections.  and the Effects of Financial Liberalization:
the Ecuadorian  and Indonesian  Cases, both managed  by the Financial Policy and Systems  Division  of the World
Bank.3
between loan recipients  and countries not receiving  loans, after controlling for initial
conditions  and external factors.
That study also goes further and examines the investment  performance of 14 countries
undergoing  structural adjustment  programs, finding that at least two factors contributed to the
disappointing  performance  of investment (Chart 1, which shows the I/GDP ratios for
recipients and non-recipients  of adjustment  loans).  First, the real devaluations  needed to
improve external balances led to an increase in the relative price of capital goods.  Second,
the authors argue that increased uncertainty  likely led investors to keep capital abroad or in
existing sectcrs, pending a clarification  of the likely course of the reforms.  Since about half
of the countries (Chile, Columbia,  Korea, Pakistan, Philippines,  Thailand, and Zambia)
underwcnt some form of financial reform during the 1980s, there may be a role of financial
sector factors in explaining  the residuals in the investment equations, as suggested  below. 3
As might be expected, a variety of factors will contribute to the determination  of
investment, including  quite prominently  the macroeconomic  environment  immediately
preceding reforms and the macro policies adopted as part of a stabilization  package.  But the
optimal design of any such measures  cannot be specified  without a clear idea of the behavior
of firms and of banks.  In Tunisia, for example, reforms occurred following  decades of direct
government  intervention  in allocating  capital, both in the form of portfolio constraints on
banks and interest rate controls, and including sectoral guidelines  for investment  and strict
prior authorization  of credits.  All of these controls rendered the system only marginally more
responsive  to market incentives  than that of the typical socialist  economy.  In late 1986, the
Tunisian  authorities began partially to free up interest rates, to ease portfolio requirements
and to reduce significantly  the extent of direct government intervention  in credit decisions.
At the same time, sweeping  reforms were introduced  to reduce protectionism  and reform the
tax system.  Part of the reforms included a sharp cut in capital spending  in the government's
3Conway  (1991), it should be noted, finds an insignificant  but slightly positive  correlation  between  real
investment  and participation  in an adjustment  program.4
budget, leading to a contraction  of S percentage points in the share of GDP accounted for by
public investment. Private investment  fell also, so that total gross investment, which had
betai  declining  in 1985-6, plummeted  by a further 26% in real terms in 1987-88,  before
beginning  to recover at the end of the decade.  Undoubtedly,  then, a variety of factors were
acting to determine  investment  outcomes, but anecdotal  evidence, including reports of excess
demand for government  bonds and difficulties  of obtaining  bank loans, suggests that financial
factors may have beca among the important  actors in this drama.
The conditions  facing Tunisia were by no means extreme relative to other developing
countries or certainly compared with that facing Eastern Euxropean  economies  today.  Also,
financial  sector reforms can contribute to credit crunches by a roundabout route:
liberalization, lax supervisory  oversight, and government  encouragement  of lending can lead
to a spurt of rapid loan growth and eventually  large loan losses, ultimately  producing a sharp
contraction  of credit.  This type of scenario is argued to have occurred in the Philippines
(Nascimento, 1991), which saw a 53% plunge of real credit to the private st-tor over a 3-
year period and a concomitant  fall in private investment. In contrast, countries -- and
Malaysia  appears to be a good case -- that eased financial  regulations  during relatively stable
times are more likely to find investment  determined  by macro factors and less by bank-
specific  influences. The thesis advanced  in the following  sections is that neither the health of
banks nor the means by which they acquire information  about their client can safely be
ignored in the adjustment  process.
m.  Structural  adjustment without  a rmancial sector
Recent research stresses that in countries pursuing structural adjustment  policies, the
credibility  of government  policy in general and, specifically, the probability that a given
reform will be reversed, are important  factors in firms' decisions  to invest in the sectors to be
favored as a result of the reform.  The response of investment, in turn, often is judged a
principal factor in determining  the success  of any reform.  One key insight  of the literature on
policy uncertainty  and investment  is that investors will weigh the magnitude  of reforms, theirex-ante probability  of sustainability,  or success, and the extent of entry and exit costs. 4 The
basis for the literature is the observation  that investment  often is largely irreversible.
Potential investors in effect hold an option to invest, which they exercise by committing
resources and thereby destroying the value of the option they hold, much like the exercising
of a financial  option.  Since uncertainty  always exists, there is always some value to not
investing, which must be balanced  against the profits foregone by "remaining  on the
sidelines."  Policy-induced  uncertainty  may be especially  important  during the initial stages of
a structural adjustment  program, when the government's  commitment  to lowering protection
or reducing a public sector deficit often is in question.
One of the key results derived is that, following  structural reform, investment  will
take place in the newly favored sectors when the net return is sufficiently  large to compensate
investors for the one-time costs of entry  - the expected costs of capital reallocation  in the
event of a policy reversal (see Appendix). As Rodrik notes, with no entry or exit costs, this
condition amounts to the popular notion that capital will relocate if the rate of return in the
"new" sector exceeds that in ihe former one.  With non-zero entry and exit costs, the larger
is the probability  of reversal, or the greater are reallocation  costs, the greater must be the
gains associated  with reform, given by the change in the rate of return.  Rodrik then
illustrates  that even small probabilities  of reversal will necessitate  a significantly  higher rate
of return when entry and exit cost are substantial. Indeed, in his example, sunk costs of
entry plus exit added up to three-quarters  of the cost of installed capital, in which case a mere
10% probability of reversal demands a 7.5 percentage point premium to elicit investment.
This situation is better when expected reversals are small, so that capital does not find it
worthwhile  to relocate subsequently,  but only if the discount rate of investors is quite high, so
that they will value highly short-run profits, or if, as with the previous case (arge  expected
reversals), one relaxes the assumption  that collapsed  reforms never revive.
Although this framework is quite simple, it underlines the importance  of adopting
See Rodrik (1989), Dixit (1987), Pindyck (1988  and 1991), and McDonald  and Siegel  (1986).6
credible reform programs and thus helps in highlighting  essential, though difficult to quantify,
aspects of reform.  Nowever, notwithstanding  Rodrik's concl !sion  that "lumpy" investment
costs must be countered by iapid adjustment, this approach does not provide an unambiguous
answer to the debate about the optimal speed of adjustment  (gradual vs. shock therapy
approaches), since credibility  cannot be observed or measured. Thus arguments car. continue
between those who believe that sticking to a slow-but-steady  timetable  will be more credible
than dramatic programs that may be difficult to maintain. Multiple equilibria are a distinct
possibility.
Another possible drawback  of this literature is that once estimates  of rates of return,
eiitry and exit costs, and probabilities and magnitudes  of reversals are made, investors are
presumed  to react instantaneously. Since bank financing often is important in many countries,
especially those with underdeveloped  capital markets, this amounts to the assumption  that
once investors become  convinced  as to the profitability of an investment, bankers will respond
immediately  with whatever financing is desired.  As is argued below, such a reaction will
depend on the degree of government  intervention  during the pre-reform period, the impact of
adjustment  on banks' portfolios, and the extent to which banks' information  capital is
impaired.
IV.  Credit Rationing with "Platonic" Banks
This section focuses on the role of banks during periods of adjustment, in a world in
which banks have no special information  about their borrowers and there is a substantiau
asymmetry  of information  between borrowers and lenders.  Following  Stiglitz-Weiss  (1981),
it is assumed that banks, the sole lenders in this setting, are unable to distinguish  among
borrowers, and accord all borrowers the same loan amount. 5 Even in this artificial
'Bankers  in this world are like the cave dwellers in Plato's Republic  who do not see the real nature of
things, but only evanescent  shadows  on the wall.  Even without  becoming  philosopher-kings,  and even without
well developed  accounting  and auditing systeras,  it is possible  that bankers will acquire information  on
borrowers  by developing  long-term  relationships  with them.  The implications  of these  more knowledgeable
bankers are the subject of the next section.7
environment, however, the health of the banking sector matters in the determination  of the
amount of cre4it extended to the private sector following  reform, and hence in the success of
the adjustment process.  Moreover, a post-reform "credit crunch"  can occur without the
tightening  of monetary policy that often characterizes  the early stabilization  phase of these
programs.  Indeed, the possibility  of such a retreat by banks should be factored in when
setting monetary policy in the early phases of reform.
Assume then that, again following  Stiglitz-Weiss  (1981) and Greenwald-Stiglitz
(1990), adverse selection occurs, so that as the contractual  rate of interest rises, eventually
the quality of borrowers diminishes to the point that the effective retuni to the bank actually
Figure 1.
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borrowers by developing  long-term  relatior  *hips  with them.  The implications  of these more knowledgeable
bankers are the subject of the next section.3
falls.  Moral hazard may account for this result as well, in that other things equal, borrowers
may engage in riskier projects as the cost of borrowing rises.  Thus the loan frontier (LF),
which shows combinations  of expected return and risk, for variations in contractual interest
ratms,  will look something  like that in figure 1, where the expected retumrn  on loans,  I  , and
the standard deviation  of loan returns, a ( a measure of risk), are plotted on the vertical and
horizontal  axes, respectively. Tt is assumed  that the Probability  of default rises with
increases in contractual  interest rates, so that eventually  higher interest rates lead to "awer
expected returns on loans as the quality of the loan portfolio deteriorates.  Banks have the
choice of holding risky loans or riskless treasury bilRs  that pay a return of rTB ithout fail.
Bankers  are assumed to be risk averse, with declining  absolute risk aversion as net worth
rises.'  Presume first that there are no controls on interest rates or portfolio decisions. If we
suppose that loan demand below ro  exceeds lending  capacity of banks, then banks will ration
credit, as Greenwald-Stiglitz  note, with the efficient investment  portfolio (EP) depicted in the
figure representing combinations  of the riskiess asset and risky loans. 7 The interest rate on
loans is given by the intersection  at point A, while the fraction  of bank assets going to loans
and T-bills is determined  at point B.  Thus banks would hold a portfolio made up of risky
loans paying rA (with risk a,.) and riskless treasury bills paying rT; the average interest rate
and risk of this portfolio is given by the point B.  Points to the right of (rA,  CIA)  on LF  will
never be chosen, as they are dominated  by portfolios  on the efficient frontier. 8
Even in this simple model, liberalization  of the financial sector could lead to increased
credit constraints for private sector investment, though whether banks augment or decrease
lending will depend on the precise nature of the controls and the reform.  In the simplest
61n  other words, the required increase  in the expected  return needed  to leave banks indifferent  decreases  as
net worth increases  at thL  same risk level.  In terms of figure 1, bank indifference  curves becomes  flatter at
higher levels of net worth and a given risk.
'if demand  were less than bank lending  capacity, EP would flatten  out to intersect  LF (not a tangency),  as
shown  in Greenwald-Stiglitz  (1990).
'HBans  can move to the right of point  A in EP only to the extent that they can borrow at the riskless rate.9
case, in which  the s3le form of financial  sector  interference  was a ceiling  oil interest  rates  on
loans, some  expansion  of credit  is likely,  as shown  in figure  2.9 If the interest  ceiling  leads
to a limit  on the expected  return  by 0anks,  given  by rd, the top of the loan frontier  curve  is
cut off, leaving  an efficient  frontier  of EPI, so that banks  will  operate  to the left cf point  C
(in the extreme  case, a corner  solution  is possible  if the interest  raw ceiling  is set at rm).' 0
Removing  the interest  rate constraint  would  then lead  banks  to supply  more loans  (moving
from  a point  like D to E): the substitution  effect  of higher  interest  rates  will lead  to more
Figure 2.
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9This discussion  was materially  improved  by conversations  with Andrew Weiss  and Fabio Schiantarelli,
though  they still may not endorse its conclusions.
'°Note  that the expected  return to banks is always less than the average interest rate on loans, given some







loans, as wiUl  the income effect when there is decreasing  absolute risk aversion.  The
consequenrt  rise in in *'estment  illustrates  a simple link between financial  sector adjustment
policies and the real economy.
A reduced supply of loans becomes more likely if the interest rate on government
paper was artificially repressed  prior to reform, as is often the case.  In general, the larger is
the increase in r-m  relative to the rate on loans, the more likely it is that banks free of
controls will choose to hold larger amounts of the riskless asset and supply fewer loans (in
figure 3, this is captured by a move from Bo  to B,).  In other words, reforms characterized
by relatively large increases in 'riskless" interest rates are more likely to see a substitution
away from rskier  loans (a flight to government  paper).11
Portfolio controls also may have characterized  the pre-reform world; if banks were
constrained  to operate at point A in Figure 4, an ending of this requirement would
automatically  lead them to hold less in the way of bank loans in the post-reform  world,
moving back to point B." Correspondingly,  banks forced to hold a high percentage of
government  paper prior to reform will likely shift towards greater lending after the constraint
is relaxed, unless the interest rate on government debt is significantly  raised.  Again, the key
point is that the manner in which the financial  sector was regulated  and the precise nature of
Figure 4.
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"Banks might face interest rate ceilings on their loans and portfolio  constraints  as well, but this combination
should admit to straightforward  analysis. Forced holding  of substantial  amounts  of government  paper in the
pre-reform  world would more likely dispose banks  to step up their lending  for investment,  as the share of
govermment  paper in their portfolios may well be above the desired level at the start of the process.  Small
increments  to rm in this case would be insufficient  to induce a shift.12
any financial  reforms will effect the rest of the economy
The foregoing  analysis assumed that the loan frontier remains unchanged  before and
after reform.  However, it should be recognized  that this curve reflects banks' perception  of
risks and, therefore, its location will change depending on bankers' views of the riskiness of
the environment. Bankers  unsure about the direction of policy might well view all loans as
riskier, in other words, the loan frontier might be viewed  as shifting  out to the right.
Alternatively,  adjustment  policies might be depicted  by a mean-preserving  spread of the loan
frontier.  In either case, the slope of the efficient frontier then would become flatter, leading
banks to shift toward holding more of the riskless asset, other things equal. 12 As will be
noted below, there are some good reasons explaining  the possibility  that this view of
increased risk could be sustained  for quite some time following  reform.  If structural reforms
instead lead to a significant  and convincing  upward shift of the loan frontier, a boost in bank
lending would then result.
Additionally,  banks' own profitability  might be adversely affected by structural
adjustment, especially  if they have a large exposure to the declining sector. Thus banks that
have lent heavily to import-competing  sectors will suffer from a steep decline in tariffs, as
wil  those with large exposures to public enterprises in the aftermath  of a reduction in public
sector investment. Assuming  that the banks remain solvent, this would amount to an
increase in the interest rate demanded  to compensate  for a given increment in the risk level
or, in other words, a steepening  of the indifference  curve.  Consequently,  the tangency with
the efficient frontier would shift to the left.' 3 This case also would  be highly relevant for
'2Structural  adjustment  might bjustw  mix up winners and losers, but only banks who can distinguish  one
from the other would be able to profit from such a change.  As we shall see in the next section, if banks have
information  mainly  about the declining  sector, they may in effect be taxed by the adjustment  and have yet
another reason, and quite likely a very powerful  one, to curtail lending.
'3Stiglitz-Weiss  (1988) derive  a similar result in a different  context. A poorly organized  reform program
might  result in a temporary  downward  shift in the loan frontier, with similar results.  In contrast, as is well
known from the experience  with U.S. Savings  and Loans, if private banks are severely effected  by reform so
that they have negative  net worth and bankers have limited liability, they may be easily tempted to bet the bank.
In figure 1 this would amount to a flattening  of the indifference  curve and increased  lending, as risk
considerations  become less important. Deposit insurance  then would  aid the banks  in their speculative  efforts.13
banks with large loans to public enterprise sectors immediately  prior to structural adjustment,
to the extent that the authorities  reduce public investment  spending. Expected returns
loans to this sector will decline fullowing  reform, impairing  banks with significant  exposures
to this sector. 14
Lastly, if controls during the pre-reform period were such that most loan decisions
were determined  by some branch of the government  -- such as the planning ministry in
socialist  economies  or the central bank/finance  ministry in countries  requiring prior approval
for loans  -- then the banks may well have underinvested  in risk assessment  skills.  To the
extent that financial  reforms led to banks being responsible  for future loans losses, they
might well behave exactly if they were facing a riskier loan frontier and hold a greater
amount  of riskless assets than might be expected. The speed of real sector adjustment  in this
case would depend on a variety of factors, not the least of which would be the interest on the
part of foreign bankers (who at least already have the infrastructure  to process information)
in entering  the market.
This simple model thus emphasizes  first, the extent to which the investment  response
depends  on tle  state of the financial sector, and second, the conditions  in which greater
credit restraint on the part of bankers might be an expected response  to financial  reform (cum
structural adjustment). The possibility  of a post liberalization  credit crunch contrasts with
the common  perception, noted in Johnston (1991), that credit growth will pick up following
reform.  His characterization  may be especially  relevant when banks have been required to
hold substantial  amounts of govemment  paper, as there would then be a post-reform  tendency
to re-balance bank portfolios. Even then, however, the response  would depend on the
change in the interest rate on government  paper relative to the rate on loans.  More
generally, banks may well hesitate to lend following  reform cum adjustment, and the failure
to anticipate  this hesitancy may produce overly optimistic  forecasts of the adjustment process.
'Private sector investment  might also decline  because  of complementarities  between  public and private
investment  spending. See Serven  (1991).14
To the extent that banks have means of developing sources of information  so that they can
distinguish  among different types of borrowers, this retrenchment  from lending is also a
distinct possibility, as elaborated below." 5
V.  Credit crunches with more informed banks
The model of the last section has some appeal in that it shows that banks' financial
condition  and perception  of risk can affect lending and, hence, investment  performance, even
when banks possess so little information  that they are unable to distinguish  among borrowers.
However, it is widely argued that banks acquire information  by building long term
relationships  with their customers, thereby becoming acquainted  not only with the underlying
business, but also with the financial  activities and repayment  performance  of the client.
According  to this view, banks become more informed  about the risks of their borrowers,
while not achieving  the superior knowledge  possessed by its clients.  Indeed, many bank
loans are not tradeable precisely because, since a bank knows its clients better than other
institutions  or the general public, it is presumed, in line with the "lemons" argument, that
only lesser quality loans will be sold, effectively  leading to the shrinkage  or disappearance  of
this market." 6 This section argues that bank lending depends on the endowment  of
information banks possess -- information capital, for short -- and that reform programs
should take into account their impact on this intangible  capital.
Bank relationships  may work to the benefit of the clients.  Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharfstein  (1989, 1990, 1991), for example, find that financially-distressed  firms in Japan
that belonged  to a group with a bank invest more than non-group firms, and that investment
by group firms is less sensitive  to liquidity constraints. Their hypothesis  is that bank
5See Hoshi, Kashyap  and Scharfstein  (1989).
1 61n the United  States, mortgages  and other standardized  and collateralized  loans are traded, as are bundles
of unsecured  small consumer  loans and, at the other extreme, loans to well established,  low risk firms.
However, in between  lies a large array of non-traded  loans.  Loan trading is more limited or virtually
nonexistent  in other countries.15
relationships  mitigate  information  and incentive  problems.  Also, James (1987), James and
Weir (1990)  and Lummer and McConnell  (1989)  provide empirical evidence on the valuation
effects of announcements  of bank-loan  agreements in the United States. These papers are
pathbreaking  in that they demonstrate  the favorable  effect of lending relationships  on stock
prices of borrowers. 17 But the explanation  that banks, through the lending approval and
monitoring  process, generate information  about their clients is common  to all three
approaches.
In developing  countries, where formal flows of information, such as would be
conveyed  by audited financial  statements  and stock prices, are recognized  to be
underdeveloped,  unreliable, or nonexistent,  it is quite likely that building such relationships
is the most reliable means of acquiring information  on firms.  By engaging in lending and
other banking relationships  with a firm, and sometimes  with its competitors  or suppliers,
banks can learn quite a bit about a given firm.  The quality of this information,  relative to
what is available "in the market," depends  on the type of bank and the control or influence
over the firm permitted by law and by market structure.' 8
Traditionially,  bank lending decisions  are thought of in a portfolio balance framework,
in which the demand for different bank assets, including  bank loans, depends  on vectors of
risk and return variables, such as
A 1/A=ff  (p,y)  (1)
where
A, =  value of asset i held by a bank,
'Mhe  articles differ as what types of lending results in movements  in stock prices.
'"Equity  participation  may be another  way to acquire information,  but even then there often is a difference
between  the information  available  to inside and outside shareholders.16
A  =  total assets of the bank,
p  =  is a vector of expected rates of return on all of the potential assets, including
money market instruments,  government obligations, various types of loans,
and real assets, and
-y  =  is a vector of the corresponding  standard deviations  of these returns.
Banks are viewed twen  as choosing  between loans and other long and short-termr  instruments
as part of a portfolio  decision. This focus might be appropriate when the right-hand side
variables  can be considered to be exogenous, at least to the bank.  However, both the
expected return and the risk associated  with a given loan often will depend both on the effort
the bank puts in to monitoring  its investment  and the information  it acquires about its clients.
Focussing on information  capital suggests  a different  approach.  Information  capital of
banks is built up over time through banking relationships,  making it plausible to presume that
the supply of bank loans depends not only on the cost and supply of resources at the banks
disposition  -- its capital, deposits, and the availability  of borrowed funds -- the rate of return
on substitutes, such as government  paper, the owners' disposition to risk, and any regulatory
constraints,  but also on its information  capital base, as this will directly affect the expected
return and risk of loans.
Thus loans (L) may be viewed as an output of banks,
L=f  (K,  D,  IB,rr,  IrK, K*/A)  (2)
where
K  the capital of the bank;
D  =  the deposit base;
IB  =  a vector of variables on the depth of the interbank markets;
r=  the interest rate on interbank instruments;
r=  the contractual  interest rate on loans;17
IK  =  the information  capital of the bank, summing  up both product and firm specific
information  relevant to lending decisions;
K*/A  the desired or maximal  capital asset ratio.
Returns to investment  in information  capital are assumed to be positive but diminishing.
Banks  then will invest in information  capital up to the point where its marginal product
equals the cost of additional  information. These costs will include acquisition  of public and
client-specific  information,  and information  processing  and analysis.  Uncertainty  exists, but
some uncertainty  can be mitigated  by investment  in information. Up to some point, banks
will both improve expected returns and reduce risk by investing  in information. In industrial
economies, information  is relatively cheap in "normal times" and its cost varies little.  There
are well-established  accounting  systems, well-developed  auditing  professions,  and an
abundance  of financial  firms who research individual  companies  and market this research.
Banks  thus find it profitable  to invest both in information  and in information  processing.
However, in developing  countries, without many of these advantages, information
often is at a premium. Moreover, financial  repression  often leads banks to underinvest  in
information  capital.  Artificially  low lending rates, for example, reduce the returns to
investment  in information. Or, if governments  are perceived to be dictating  loans through
various selective  credit programs or a prior approval process," 9 or giving loan guarantees,
bankers  often believe that governments  will stand behind loans in the event they become
nonperforming,  in which case it only pays to hire relatively few and unsophisticated  loan
officers and to invest little in acquiring information. Moreover, governments  often direct a
sizeable  proportion of bank credit to certain sectors, such as state enterprises and industries
producing for the domestic market (often at an overvalued  exchange rate), which are
rendered uncompetitive  by the reductions in public investment spending  and in the degree of
protection  associated  with structural adjustment.
"This  procedure  appears in a number of developing  countries, whereby  loans above a certain size (often
quite small, even relative to the indigenous  market) require prior authorization  of either the central bank or the
finance ministry.18
Financial reform -- a reduction in government intervention in bank decision3 -- at the
very least finds banks with little information  (and financial)  capital.  The pullback by the
government  ofter means that the banks are on their own for bearing the costs of future
losses; thus from the banks' view, in terms of the model of Section III, the loan return curve
shifts out to the right.  At the same time, the initiation,  of a structural adjustment program (or
any potentially severe macro shock) can wipe out a good portion of information  capital by
reducing the attraction of lending to large, established  firms (often public enterprises, at
times the only large firms in the economy), pushing the loan return curve  ur -er to the right.
As we saw above, the result of such a shift is to lead banks to attempt to hold more of the
riskless asset.  Ir effect, there are two groups of firms, as in the Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharfstein  representation  of Japan, namely those with relationships  to banks and those
without, and structural adjustment  may severely reduce the attractiveness  of loans to the only
sector about which banks may have any information. Those banks or countries with a
concentration  of firms having  close bank relationships  concentrated  in the declining sector
will experience the sharpest  decline of lending following  reforms, unless the banks are made
insolvent (in which case they likely will decide to "bet the bank") or are state-owned  (in
which case they may well continue to lend to loss making firms). 20
To be sure, banks will also be affected by the impairment  of their loan portfolio, but
the destruction  of information  capital itself can be important  as well, suggesting  that even a
government "clean up" of bank portfolios at the time of liberalization  may not be sufficient
to induce significant  bank lending. 2"  Indeed, this point is regularly overlooked  in articles on
reforming socialist economies,  where if is argued that banks should be audited and then
cleaned up and left on their own to determine their own lending behavior.  But in a high risk
0Gertler-Rose  (1991) emphasize  the importance  of borrower net worth in affecting  the success of
liberalization  efforts.  This approach suggests  that even if economy-wide  net worth is unimpaired  by reforms or
other shocks, a contraction  of credit might still be expected  if the declining  sector is the main one on which
banks have information.
2'By clean up is meant  either the replacement  of nonperforming  loans with perfonming  assets (often
government  bonds) or the writing  down of bad assets and an equivalent  removal  ox liabilities  from the balance
sheet of the banking system.19
environment,  where many if not all of the state enterprises -- the only large enterprises in the
country -- have become  decidedly risky businesses  (absent  a govemment  guarantee), it is all
too likely that unregulated  banks will choose to hold safe assets as  anuch  as possible and to
lend relatively little.  This abrupt retrenchment  by banks may well be inappropriate for
macroeconomic  reasons.2
As time passes banks will build up their information  capital, assuming that they face
the right incentives. The rebuilding  of information  capital will depend on the:
*  the availability  and accuracy of accounts;
*  the stability  of relative prices; and
*  the returns to investments  in information.
Thus, the loan return curve will gradually shift back in to the left, leading to a
diversification  away from safer assets.  However, this shift might be a slow process.  The
more concentrated  the pre-reform banks' portfolio in the dying sectors, the greater the
expected destruction  of both financial  and information  capital and the slower is the expected
recovery. In economies  where investment  in all of the large firms is rendered unprofitable,
banks will be left with smaller -- though potentially  rapidly growing -- firms about which
they have little information. That these small firms themselves  have little knowledge  of how
to keep proper records, deal with banks, or fill out loan forms will further retard the
recovery  process.  Post-adjustment  economies  might then for quite some time remain in "low
lending" traps, despite the assertions by entrepreneurs  that there are a number of profitable
investment  opportunities. Prior to or early in the adjustment  process, governments  should
focus attention  on reducing  the cost of information  capital to the financial  sector.'
220f course, a retrenchment  might  not oe the worst prospect. Banks  can continue to lend to insolvent
enterprises  after refotms, possibly  on instruction  from the government,  and thus retard the needed real-sector
change. Even evergreening  unpaid debts will inhibit  bank's ability to lend to other firms in the presence  of
bank-by-bank  credit ceilings.
3Equity  can help to spread risk, but there is little evidence  that equities can become significant  without
some way to monitor  investments,  which is where banks appear to excel.20
This type of low-lending  trap can be obtained from another approach, as noted by
Lang and Nakamura (1990), in which lenders only make loans based on information  available
to all market participants, namely on projects' current retums and those realized during
previous periods.  Their model is markedly more neoclassical  than the present approach, and
they assume that borrowers have no incentive to misrepresent  returns.  In their approach,
the inflow of information  is based on the flow of new loans, so that any shock that depresses
lending in the cLrrent period tends to perpetuate itself, that is, a decline in the number of
projects leads to a decline in information,  which in turn feeds back to increase the risk of
future projects and reduces further the number of new loans.  This learning effect can
persist, and may be initiated  by a variety of shocks, not the least of which may be the
measures  associated  with a structural adjustment  program, mentioned  above.  Moreover, this
model shares the feature of the present one that low-lending  traps likely will be more
pronounced  or longer-lasting  when markets for information  are underdeveloped,  that is, in
developing  countries.
VI.  Implications for Financial Liberalization
Financial  reform often is accompanied  by other changes as well, including structural
adjustment  programs, and the combined experiment  may be judged a success or failure
depending  on the extent and efficiency  of the ensuing investment. This paper argues that
even after factoring in the decisions  of firms, lenders' reactions should be considered as well.
The approach by Rodrik and others is revealing: hysteresis,  associated  with entry and exit
costs, and the relation of these costs to the probability that a reform will be reversed
undoubtedly  matter in entrepreneurs' judgements about irnvesting  in a post-reform  world.
However, it is useful to note that their judgements  are not the only ones that matter.  In
addition  to the sunk costs of physical capital investment, there are also sunk costs of
information  development  which banks must consider.  These sunk costs are often ignored in
industrial  economies  in "normal" times because information  costs are low and banks are
assumed to possess ample information  about all sectors of the economy.  In the latter
environment,  the destruction  of information  would be a rare event, such as with the failure of21
a large part of the banking system, as portrayed by Berinanke  (1983).  But in developing
economies, where banks may possess limited information  about all but a small number of
large firms, the potential  for a destruction  of a significant  amount of information  capital is
great.  The utility of the present approach is that it may help to explain why some countries,
such as very pcor ones with undiversified  financial  systems, can have difficulty  with financial
reform; this knowledge  may, in turn, assist in the construction of more successful  reform
programs.
It is important  to ncte that this approach  does not imply that abrupt changes in
relative prices should be avoided, but rather that the encouragement  of banks to develop links
based on distorted prices is more costly than commonly  realized. Thus this approach argues
that: (1) policy :"dvisers  should be properly circumspect  in their forecasts of rapid post-
adjustment  recoveries; and (2) structural adjustment/financial  reform programs should take
account  of the extent to which bank relationships  are going to be disrupted, either by failing
banks or by a destruction  of information. Accepted  wisdom is that financial  reform should
not precede "real" sector adjustment, because to do otherwise will lead banks to get into
trouble by lending at disequilibrium  prices.  However, the view that all financial  reforms can
wait until after structural adjustments  are complete  is equally dangerous.  Credible  programs
without some basic preparation of the financial  sector may find Rodrik-style  investors ready
to invest but without sufficient  capital or other financial  resources.
One form of preparation would be a f:nancial  sector extension service, offering
accounting training  to firms and helping  with the start up of auditing firms.  Partial
guarantees to younger firms in, for example, the export sector (following  a devaluation)
might help offset some of the risk associated  with lending to new clients. 24 Since this period
of uncertainty  would only be expected to persist for a limited period of time -- say at most 2-
3 years following  structural adjustment -- a firm "sunset" period should be imposed on any
24However,  full guarantees  would undermine  the banks' incentives  to invest in information  gathering  and
monitoring.22
subsidies. Alternatively,  governments  could give an investment  tax credit in information
capital; only since information  is difficult to measure, the credit would be equal to some
small proportion  of loans made (again, perhaps to new clients in specific  sector).  In effect,
this would amount to the government  temporarily  buying down the rate for the beneficiaries.
Even following  the expiration  of such a tax credit program, it could be expected that bank
spreads would be sizable, since lending to newer firms is more costly than a few loans to
large enterprises. But as these new firms grow, spreads would be expected to decline.
Countries  that are good candidates  for successful  reforms -- in both real and financial
sectors -- are those with more diversified  banking systems, which tend to be those in well-
diversified  economies  and without  a recent history of severe financial  repression.  Countries
that have tightly limited the ability of residents to hold foreign assets may face a portfolio
adjustment  if they ease capital controls at the time of reform, as they are in effect
introducing  another potentially  lower risk asset, in terms of the approach of Section III.  In
this sense, countries with a history of relatively  open capital markets will be better off in not
having a "pent up demand" for such assets, in addition to the mitigating  effects thereof on
the degree of repression. Well capitalized banking systems naturally will tend to fare better
facing reforms, though even a high degree of financial  capital may not lead banks to be more
aggressive  lenders in the face of an increase  in uncertainty  (i.e., a substantial  reduction in
their information  capital).  Clear signals from reforming governments  on the direction of
policies will help both entrepreneurs  and their financiers. Absent these signals, banks will
not be sure where to be concentrating  their investment  in rebuilding  their information  capital
stock, leading in all likelihood  to longer periods of retrenchment  in the loan market.23
Appendix
Following Rodrik (1989), consider the situation  in which investors have the choice of
either investing  abroad, which yields a certain return, r*, or of holding  physical capital. 25
The latter pays a pre-reform return of r - to, where r represents the marginal produCt  of
capital and to  the impact of the policy distortion, such as an overvalued  exchange rate or an
import-substitution  program. 26 The tax equivalent  value of this distortion following  the
reform declines to t, where it remains as long as the reform is not reversed.  Let Tr represent
the probability that the adjustment  program will be reversed, in which case it is supposed  that
the return on capital reverts to r - to and remains there forever, admittedly  an unrealistic
assumption. If V 1 denotes  the value to holding  a share of capital in the economy  at the
moment  a reform is introduced  and  vR denotes the value of the same investment in the event
that the reform is reversed, then, as Rodrik shows, the discounted  value of being invested is:
V1 =  ((r-t)  - ir(V 1 - VR)  /p  (1)
where  p  is the discount rate, Vl-  v,R is the capital loss in the event of a reversal, and
r(VI - v,R ) is the expected value of the loss per unit of time.  If the exit costs per unit of
capital are given by o , then investors will relocate capital (move back into the instrument
with the riskless return) after a reversal if
2The key feature  of the first asset is that its return ;s invariant  witfh  respect to structural  adjustment
measures. In fact. even the domestic  currency  value of foreign  assets may be effected  by the success  or failure
of structural  adjustment  policies, as will be domestic  treasury bills, another  candidate  as a standard for a 'risk-
free" rate of return.
26Clearly,  a two-sector  model  would  do more  justice of the complexity  of the situation,  as returns in
different  sectors will behave differently  following  adjustment. But the simplification  in the text holds as long as
reform boosts the average return to capital in the economy,  or equivalently  the return to owning a share in an
economy-wide  mutual  fund.24
r-to  < r-  pO  (2)
or, in other words, if the returns to remaining  invested are less than those of disinvesting,
taking account of the exit costs.  Capital will remain invested if reversals are expected to be
small, and revert to the riskless asset otherwise. Rodiik then analyzes the position of an
investor with capital in the riskless asset, to see under what conditions  capital will relocate.
Assuming  that investment  will be forthcoming  if VI 2  VO  +  e  , where  e
represent entry costs per unit of capital, this condition reduces to
(r -t)  - r'  2  1(e  + 0)  + ep  (3)
when potential  reversals are sufficiently  large to make it worthwhile for investors to move
their capital out of the sector (or economy). In this terminology, t, the tax equivalent  of the
policy-induced  distortion, must be low enough in the post-reform  world so that the net return
on investment  becomes  great enough to compensate  investors for the one-time costs of
entry  (ep)  , and for the expected costs of capital reallocation  in the event of a policy
reversal  (n (e + e) )  . As Rodrik notes, with no entry or exit costs, the right-hand-side  of
equation (3) is 0, so that the condition would amount to the popular notion that capital will
relocate if the rate of return in the "new" sector exceed that in the former one.  With non-
zero entry and exit costs, the larger is the probability  of reversal, or the greater are
reallocation  costs, the greater must be the gains associated  with reform, given by the change
in return.  As noted above, even small probabilities  of reversal will necessitate a significantly
higher rate of return when entry and exit cost are substantial.25
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